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AUTHOR Barrington, Lowell W.
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ABSTRACT

This study attempts to examine and explain the citizenship choices made by the governments of Estonia and Lithuania. The report explains the factors driving the inclusiveness of the policies. The project attempts to discover those factors that lead the government of a newly independent state to develop a more inclusive or more exclusive citizenship policy. Factors that likely affect the development of citizenship policies include: (1) an ethnically defined nation or political-territorially defined nation; (2) whether or not the newly independent state is seen as a nation-state or as a multi-national state; (3) a perceived threat to survival of the nation; (4) strength of minority groups in size, concentration, and economic power; and (5) powerful neighbors interested in inclusive policies due to a large ethnic minority in their own country or human rights organizations monitoring citizenship policies. These factors and questions, although applied to Lithuania and Estonia, also address the civic issues of democracy. Extensive notes accompany the text. Contains approximately 100 references. (EH)

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AN EXPLANATION OF THE CITIZENSHIP POLICIES OF ESTONIA AND LITHUANIA

Lowell W. Barrington
University of Michigan

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INTRODUCTION

One policy decision by leaders of a newly independent state divides the population into two mutually exclusive groups and can affect whether or not entire segments of the population receive a critical set of political and social rights. The policy is citizenship, and the decision is how to define the citizenry. Citizenship has not received the publicity of other changes in the post-Communist world such as economic transition or the development and evolution of ruling institutions. Yet, citizenship can affect voting, occupation, and residence and can create tensions between those who receive it and those who do not. The exclusion of minority groups in one state can affect the actions of other states due to the heterogeneous populations of central Europe and Eurasia. Perceived oppression of Russians in former USSR republics has led some to call on the Russian government to protect its "brothers and sisters" in other states. Groups such as the CSCE are monitoring events surrounding citizenship precisely because of their potential to spark actions outside the normal political arena, violence, tensions between states, and further territorial division. Thus, whether or not all permanent residents may become citizens is a central question in post-Communist states, and nowhere has this issue been more controversial than in the Baltic region. In Lithuania, provisions for "automatic" citizenship were quite inclusive. In Estonia, however, many were excluded from the initial base of citizens.

This study is an attempt at examining and explaining the citizenship choices made by the governments of Estonia and Lithuania. The goal of this project is to go beyond a description of the laws themselves by explaining the factors driving the inclusiveness of the policies. The central question of the project is: *what factors lead the government of a newly independent state to develop a more inclusive or more exclusive citizenship policy?* I examine five factors (two internal and three external) that likely affect the development of citizenship policies. I find that perceptions about "the nation" are quite important in understanding the policy decisions. Yet, looking at these perceptions alone (as some have done) would miss important direct effects from European organizations and a complex pattern of relationships among the variables.

This project helps fill a gap in the literature on the *causes* of the specific citizenship outcomes. Most of the few works that have appeared on citizenship in the post-Communist states are highly descriptive. These articles are quite useful for getting an idea about the inclusiveness of the policies but lack a general theory of the causes. A large number of works from political theory also examine citizenship. However, they tend to address certain questions such as what is a citizen, why is citizenship important, and what kind of rights citizens *should* have without looking at specific factors that drive this debate in the real world. While interesting, these works also fail to develop a clear theory about the *causes* of differences in citizenship policies. Brubaker's (1992a) work on citizenship and national identity in Germany and France, his smaller work (Brubaker 1992b) on the Soviet successor states, a piece by Stepan (1992), and three works by Ginsburgs (1990, 1992, 1993) stand as the most useful for developing a theory that explains citizenship in newly independent states. I draw heavily on Brubaker's work particularly in examining the impact of an ethnically defined nation. Yet, the factors discussed by Brubaker, Stepan, and Ginsburgs do not tell the whole story. Other factors must be examined.

The second weakness in the social science literature that this project addresses relates to these other factors. Even when combining Brubaker's and Stepan's (1992) discussion of policy in the newly independent states, for example, one is left with only the internal (domestic) factors. The effect of international organizations and foreign countries on domestic policy in a given state, however, must also be taken into account. These factors have been discussed in some works in the political science literature (studies on the role of the IMF in affecting economic policy or the EC in forcing domestic change as a condition of membership, for example), but how external forces influence domestic policy remains one of the least understood and most important questions in political science. Too often, those studying comparative politics have looked only at domestic explanations of domestic policy. Even more often, those working in the field of international relations have focused on the domestic causes of foreign policy and not addressed the foreign causes of domestic policy.

While a study of only two states cannot provide a definitive answer to the question of citizenship inclusiveness, this project will aid in the understanding of the *reasons behind* variation in citizenship policies. In addition to the importance of citizenship in its own right, the examination of this topic will also inform larger issues such as the link between domestic politics and international relations, the role of ethnic identity and nationalism in domestic policy-making, and the attempts to define and redefine nations and states in the post-Communist world.

CITIZENSHIP AND ITS POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR RIGHTS

Defining citizenship.

The idea of citizenship is crucial to understanding "the state" and politics within it. Citizenship is "one of the fundamental elements of statehood" (Kionka 1991, 23) and differentiates among the population living within a state. It sets the boundaries for "full membership" in the political community (Walzer 1983, 43). The percentage of residents that are granted citizenship affects perceptions of the state by those inside and outside its borders. Despite its importance (or perhaps because of it), there is little agreement on the meaning of citizenship. It can be used to mean at least three things:

> It could, first, be used to describe and evaluate the law relating to nationality and immigration, in order to determine who is, and who can become a citizen of the United Kingdom...A second meaning of citizenship would be a description of the legal rights and duties which actually operate between citizens and the state...A third meaning of the concept of citizenship would be concerned with the principles that ought to appertain between citizens and the state (Craig 1993, 308).

Norman (1992) echoes the point that political theorists often discuss citizenship as a bundle of political, civil, and social rights. Some see citizenship as defined by passive rights, while others feel that the citizen "experiences citizenship as *practice* (active participation in the determination, protection, and promotion of of the common good)" (Peled 1992, 433, italics in original). Thus, citizenship can even be defined as the *performance of duties* (being a "good citizen").

I feel that this idea of bringing rights and duties directly into the definition has generated much of the confusion (or at least my confusion) in the political theory literature on citizenship. It leads to a blurring of citizenship and other memberships that carry *some* of the same rights. Distinctions (based on rights) have been made between citizenship and "full citizenship" (see, for example, Bendix 1964, ch. 3). In addition, rights for people most would agree to call "citizens" can vary from country to country and time to time. Therefore, selecting a fixed set of rights and/or duties to use as the basis of a definition is problematic at best, impossible at worst. By coming up with a definition of citizenship that does not depend on certain rights, we are not restricted from discussing rights. But we need to be clear that the rights of citizenship are different than the decision of who makes up the citizenry.

Citizenship is official membership in a political community, generally the state. As the newly adopted Latvian citizenship law puts it, citizenship "is a person's permanent legal connection with the state" (see Republic of Latvia Law on Citizenship 1994, Art. 1). The idea that the individual is connected to the state on an equal basis with other citizens gives rise to the rights and duties many have associated with citizenship. Thus, for the purpose of this study, citizenship is defined as follows: *it is official membership in the state, its boundaries are set by a government representing the state, and it implies a certain equality among members*. Citizenship *policy* is the set of official rules and de facto procedures which affect this official membership. This study is concerned with Craig's first idea of citizenship mentioned above: who is, and who can be, a citizen.

Citizenship, political rights, and social benefits.

This discussion of separating the definition of citizenship from the rights and duties connected to it does not imply that these rights and duties are unimportant. In fact, it is the difference in duties and, especially, rights between citizens and non-citizens that makes citizenship such a potent issue. While the central goal of this project is understanding *admission into citizenship*, it is also necessary to discuss the possible consequences of this membership in order to understand why inclusion matters.

Residents in a newly independent state know that non-citizens are unlikely to receive all the rights granted to citizens. Often in democracies only citizens have the right to participate politically. Non-citizens may be denied the opportunity to run for office, form parties, or even vote. In the Baltic states, citizens have numerous political rights that non-citizens do not. In Estonia, an important right, the right to vote in national elections, had a major impact on the 1992 presidential and parliamentary elections. A law passed in the Estonian Supreme Council stated that only citizens could vote in the national elections. Amendments to open the franchise to non-citizen permanent residents were defeated ("State Assembly Passes Law on Elections" 1992, 71). The elections, on September 20, 1992, were Estonia's first national elections since independence. The lack of political rights for non-citizens has alienated even those non-Estonians who supported the move toward independence for Estonia. Many participated in organizations such as the Estonian Popular Front, but today they "no longer believe they can, or want, to participate in Estonian politics" (Stepan 1992, 19).

In addition to the psychological effect, the make-up of the electorate had a direct political effect. Despite the large Russian population in Estonia and 23 Russian representatives in the old Supreme Soviet, no Russian representatives were elected to the new assembly, the Riigikogu ("Russian Envoy Says Elections Not Democratic" 1993, 64 and Stepan 1992, 17). Russians pointed out that the new parliament in part "will decide the scope of rights for non-citizens" ("Citizenship Law, Russian Problem Examined" 1992, 55), and without representatives sympathetic to their situation, many Russians in Estonia expected discriminatory policies to emerge from the Riigikogu. In addition to limited voting rights, non-citizens in Estonia are prohibited from holding national or local political office and joining political parties (Bungs, Girnius, and Kionka 1992, 39). Thus, while non-citizens were allowed to vote in local elections, their choices were limited.[1]

Citizenship also brings a greater assurance of social benefits. As Ginsburgs (1990, 14) states, "full-fledged citizenship affords the most reliable surety of the enjoyment of the ensemble of social rights practices in a particular community." This "surety" comes from the political rights that citizens enjoy, mentioned above, which allow them to pressure the system for protection. It also comes from a belief that, given their special membership status, citizens deserve protection from the government representing that state that non-citizens do not deserve.

In the West we tend to focus on the political rights granted to citizens. These social benefits, however, may be even more important. In the chaotic situation in the former Communist world, the lack of access to housing, work, or welfare benefits is an even greater worry than it is in the less chaotic West. This worry has been fueled by rumors about impending action against non-citizens. Reports in the Russian press in 1993, for example, discussed the possibility of the expulsion of some Russians from their apartments in Estonia (see *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* June 24, 1993, p. 1, for one example).

"INCLUSIVE" AND "EXCLUSIVE" CITIZENSHIP

While all citizenship laws set boundaries, the requirements for crossing the citizenship boundary differ from country to country. Therefore, it is possible to describe one country's citizenship policy as more exclusive than another's. A law which requires ten years of residency for naturalization, for example, is more exclusive than one that requires only five. Assuming the other requirements were met, an individual who has lived in the first country for six years could not become a citizen. In the other country, she could. Furthermore, laws which do not guarantee citizenship to all people born in the country are more exclusive than those that do.

Another area of citizenship policy is "dual citizenship." The leaders of a new state must decide whether or not a person can have citizenship in another state as well as the state in question. The government of Russia has favored dual citizenship as a way for Russians in other former Soviet republics to stay in that former republic while still maintaining ties to Moscow. Other new states, especially in the Baltic region, have opposed dual citizenship. The Czech Republic decided to allow dual citizenship with any state "that does not explicitly bar it -- except Slovakia" ("One of Us or One of Them" 1993, 46). Since dual citizenship may allow certain residents to feel more comfortable about

obtaining citizenship in their state of residence (they have somewhere else to turn), a policy that includes dual citizenship can be considered more inclusive than one that does not allow it.

In addition to setting policy on naturalization, replenishment by birth, and dual citizenship, governments of newly independent states face a decision that rulers of existing states do not. They must decide who makes up the initial *base* of citizens to which birth and naturalization add. A law that creates a base from sixty percent of the permanent residents is more exclusive than one that allows all existing permanent residents to become citizens. Because of the number of people affected by creating a base of citizens, the guidelines for initial, "automatic" citizenship are the most important part of the inclusive/exclusive distinction in newly independent states. In this project, provisions for automatic citizenship are weighted most heavily in discussing the inclusiveness of the citizenship policy.

While necessarily relative, the terms "exclusive" and "inclusive" in this study are meant to be empirical, not normative. Many political theorists argue that inclusive laws are morally correct (see, for example, Walzer 1983 and Carens 1989). Particularly in the Baltic States, however, moral arguments supporting *exclusion* of certain groups can be quite persuasive (to see how one could argue for exclusion on moral grounds in the Baltic states, see Brubaker 1992b, 287-288).

CITIZENSHIP POLICIES VERSUS CITIZENSHIP LAWS

So far, I have discussed citizenship both in terms of the specific citizenship law and with a more vague reference to citizenship "policy." Why focus on citizenship policy rather than citizenship law? I feel that limiting the examination to official laws can miss important dimensions of the overall citizenship policy. Roeder's (1993) recent work on Soviet politics and the collapse focuses on "the constitution of Bolshevism" by looking for the *real* rules of the game behind the official constitution. Two academics from the former Yugoslavia with whom I spoke criticized Hayden's (1992) piece on "constitutional nationalism" in the former Yugoslavia for not taking this approach. They both claimed that by looking only at the official law, Hayden missed a great deal of the discrimination, especially within Serbia. Examples of variation between official policy and actual practice are not confined to the post-Communist world. In France, for example, official policy differed from "actual administrative practice" when local officials used vagueness in the government policy and difficulties in enforcement to act on their own to limit immigrant settlement (Silverman 1991, 338).

The difference between de facto policy and the official law does not have to lead to exclusive actions. Officials could also choose not to enforce certain exclusive laws. In Estonia, for example, the official language policy calls for proficiency in Estonian for certain jobs. Elite interviews conducted by Hanson (1993), however, indicate that official and de facto policy may be very different. One official told him simply that "the law would not necessarily be implemented" (Hanson 1993, 23). Thus, it is possible that de facto parts of the policy (not enforcing official, exclusive provisions) could add to the inclusiveness of the overall policy. Yet, in the case of citizenship policy, both the Russians in Estonia and the European observers have opposed vagueness in the law precisely because of the likelihood that it would *increase exclusion* by allowing local officials to deny naturalization.

It is important, therefore, to look beyond the letter of the citizenship law. I realize this adds to the subjectivity of the project. Yet, by carefully considering claims of de facto policy, this study will avoid the assumption that official law is real policy. In addition, the difference between actual policy and official policy in Estonia and Lithuania appears to be small, with the largest problems occurring in Estonia immediately after passage of the citizenship law.

THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

Assuming citizenship matters, and we can identify differences in the inclusiveness of the policies, what would likely affect that inclusiveness in Lithuania and Estonia?

Internal factors.

By defining membership in the political community, citizenship is the ultimate domestic policy. While this does not preclude external factors from playing a role, factors within the country will undoubtedly be highly important. With its potential to exclude, groups that may be excluded, such as

ethnic minorities, have a particular interest in the outcome of the citizenship debate. So, however, does the majority group when citizenship becomes linked to *national* identity as well as political membership.

Perceptions about "the nation."

Citizenship defines members of a state. Yet, since the 18th century, the ideas of state and nation have become intertwined. Thus, it is likely that defining official membership in the *state* would be affected by ideas about the *nation*.[2] These ideas about "the nation" center around three questions: is the nation ethnically defined; is the state considered a nation-state or a multinational state; and is there a perception that the nation is culturally threatened?

Ethnic or civic nation?

Brubaker (1992a) makes a powerful argument about the role of national identity in affecting the formation of inclusive or exclusive citizenship policies. In this work on Germany and France, Brubaker shows how "differing definitions of citizenship have been shaped by and sustained by distinctive and deeply rooted understandings of nationhood" (Brubaker 1992a, x-xi). He argues that the more exclusive nature of the German law is partly due to the ethnic definition of the German nation. In France, however, a political definition of nationhood led to a more inclusive law. Thus, the key is *whether the nation is defined ethnically or political-territorially*. His argument is summarized in the following paragraph:

> For several centuries, nonetheless, the prevailing French and German idioms of nationhood have differed markedly; and they continue to differ today. These distinctive understandings of nationhood are are embodied and expressed in sharply differing definitions of citizenship. The expansive, assimilationist citizenship law of France, which automatically transforms second-generation immigrants into citizens, reflects the state-centered, assimilationist self-understanding of the French. And the German definition of the citizenry as a community of descent, restrictive toward non-German immigrants yet remarkably expansive toward ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, reflects the pronounced ethnocultural inflection in German self-understanding (Brubaker 1992a, 14).

This explanation is quite powerful in these two cases because of its parsimony. Unfortunately, it is less useful for explaining the citizenship outcomes of post-Communist newly independent states than it is for explaining France and Germany. This is due to the lack of variation in this explanatory variable in the former Soviet republics. In Lithuania, like Latvia and Estonia, the nation is defined in ethnic terms. This would imply, following Brubaker's logic, that all three of the Baltic states should have quite exclusive citizenship policies. Instead, the Lithuanian policy was more inclusive than the others' policies, particularly in the most crucial element, those who receive automatic citizenship. This indicates that whether the nation is ethnically defined is only part of the story. To be fair, Brubaker acknowledges this to a certain extent in his work (see Brubaker 1992a, 17).

Nation-state or multinational state?

Stepan (1992) points out the second perception related to the idea of the nation that could affect treatment of ethnic minorities: *whether or not the newly independent state is seen as a nation-state or as a multinational state*. He claims that the identification of Estonia as a nation-state (the state of the Estonians) led directly to a policy of excluding those who were not ethnically Estonian from obtaining automatic citizenship. Had Estonian leaders seen Estonia more as a multinational state than as the Estonian homeland, exclusion would have been less likely.

The difference between the perceptions about the *nation* and the perceptions about the *state* deserves elaboration. If the state is seen as the national homeland, an ethnic definition of the nation could be decisive in producing exclusive citizenship requirements. The majority (ethnically defined) national group would receive citizenship easily, but others who are members of another ethnic group would have a more difficult time. If the state is considered a multinational state, however, an ethnic definition of the nation *could not* lead to an exclusive law. The recognition of the *multinational*

character of the state by the majority national group would lead those of a minority (ethnically defined) nation within the state to acquire "official membership." Likewise, if a new state is seen as a nation-state but has a political (territorial) definition of nationhood, the resulting citizenship policy would be inclusive. Because the nation is defined by *political membership* (Americans, for example), residents in the state at the time of independence, regardless of ethnic identity, would receive citizenship easily.

Thus, neither an ethnically defined nation nor the perception of the state as a nation-state is sufficient to produce an exclusive law. In combination, they can be quite powerful, but alone they say little. We simply cannot explain the effect of an ethnically defined nation until we know whether or not the state is considered a nation-state. Likewise, we cannot know explain the effect of a perception of the state as a nation-state until we know whether or not the nation is defined in ethnic terms.

Threat to survival of the nation.

The third perception related to the nation is the idea of a perceived *threat to the survival of the nation*. Immigration into the republics of Latvia and Estonia during the Soviet period reduced the percentage of the population of the republic that was "native" and raised fears of "national extinction" (Brubaker 1992b, 272). Stepan (1992, 15) adds, "the evocation of linguistic extinction makes it easier to create a politics of Russian exclusion, instead of a politics of inclusion." This perception (threat to national survival) likely affects the *degree* of exclusion that results from this variable but is not necessary for exclusive provisions. As Stepan (1992) points out, a perception that the survival of the nation is in doubt makes it easier to justify protecting the nation in any way possible, including limiting the rights of the minority that is perceived to be a threat. This perception could add fuel for exclusion created by the other perceptions mentioned above.[3]

At this point it is necessary to ask why I group these perceptions as a single variable. I argue that it is best to think of them as a single variable because they are so interdependent. If one knows that the state is seen as a multinational state, she could predict an inclusive policy would result. If one knows that the state is perceived to be a nation-state, however, she can say nothing about the causal relationship between that finding and the citizenship policy without knowing whether the nation is seen in ethnic or political terms and whether it is perceived to be threatened. Only when one knows all three perceptions is it possible to use the perceptions about the nation to help predict the inclusiveness of the citizenship policy.

Thus, I hypothesize that in states with an ethnic definition of the nation, a view of the state as a nation-state, and a perception of cultural threat held by the majority ethnic group, the citizenship policy will be highly exclusive. If either the state is seen as a multinational state or the nation is defined in political terms by the majority, exclusiveness will be minimal. Figure 1 displays the hypothesized relationship between the different questions about the nation and the exclusiveness of the citizenship policy in a given newly independent state.

[Figure 1 about here]

Strength of minority groups.

As important as perceptions about the nation are to the exclusiveness of the citizenship policy, and as valuable as citizenship policy is as a tangible example of the effects of nationalism, other variables must not be ignored. The size, concentration, and economic power of a potentially excluded minority will likely play a role in the development of a policy.[4] Since elites know that excluding a group from citizenship may force it to act in "unconventional" ways, one could argue that it would be difficult to exclude a large and economically powerful minority from citizenship. If a group is only five percent of the population and spread throughout the country, elites would likely perceive the potential for organized opposition to the policy to be less than if the minority was twenty percent of the population and concentrated in a certain region. This makes even more sense in a country facing a difficult economic transition or where the minority can disrupt a certain, crucial industry (energy, mining, etc.). Brubaker (1992b, 276) briefly mentions this possibility for Ukraine where elites did not want to alienate "the large Russian minority (more than 11 million)."[5]

Figure 1 – THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE "NATION" TO THE EXCLUSIVENESS OF THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATE'S CITIZENSHIP POLICY.



External factors.

Factors within a state are likely to be only part of the story. As Huntington (1991, 85) points out, "Democratization in a country may be influenced, perhaps decisively, by the actions of governments and institutions external to that country." Like general trends of democratization, specific policies are not made in a domestic vacuum. This is particularly true in the case of a policy that can greatly impact regional stability or the lives of "brothers and sisters" in another state. Citizenship can do both. Shanks (1994, 35), discussing the need to look beyond domestic explanations, states, "To the contrary of what many have assumed, fights over membership cannot be only domestic fights. Exile and foreigners must lurk in the background for 'citizenship' to make sense."

Thus, given its characteristics, citizenship policy is likely to produce external interest. Without other countries or organizations *showing* this interest, however, it is difficult for them to have an effect. In other words, one must know more than that an actor exists that should be interested. One must also find out if that actor has actually expressed interest. In addition, for external factors to be important, there must be a willingness in the country where the policy is established to allow them to be important. The leaders must see a reason for listening to advice from the outside.[6]

Neighbors with "brothers and sisters" in the state.

One external variable might be a neighboring country in which the dominant group is ethnically the same as the minority in the state setting citizenship policy. If that neighbor is large and powerful (in terms of posing a military threat or employing damaging economic sanctions), its desire for an inclusive law might play a role in affecting the citizenship outcome.

I assume here that the neighbor would want an inclusive law. This is reasonable in the case of a neighbor such as Russia which, despite pushing the idea of dual citizenship, has not been eager to accept a greater influx of Russians from the other states than already exists. Unless you believe the idea that Russia is looking for any excuse to intervene militarily in the surrounding states, it is in Russia's interests for the Russians outside Russia to feel at home.

International organizations interested in inclusive laws.

Neighboring states are not the only ones interested in citizenship policies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. International organizations from human rights groups to the EC and UN have monitored citizenship legislation. As with the effect of neighboring states, there are two factors to consider when analyzing the impact of international organizations: the expressed interest of the international organizations in the given state's citizenship policies and the willingness of the government of that state to listen to these organizations. If the international community is not interested in the formation of citizenship policies, it will not have an effect. It also must have something to offer the state's leaders. One thing European organizations can offer is acceptance of the newly independent as a part of Europe. Where there is a strong desire for its state to "join Europe," it is much more likely that the government will consider European criticism of its citizenship policy. Of course, if European organizations can offer financial aid or military protection, the incentive to listen is even stronger.[7]

Emigre communities.

While less formal than international organizations or the governments of neighboring states, the role of emigres abroad should not be dismissed. Many emigres have returned to play prominent roles in domestic politics. Even those who do not return, however, can have an impact on citizenship policy. They may suggest changes and protest provisions in the policies that decrease their possibility of gaining citizenship. Thus, one would expect that when emigres become involved in citizenship policy formation from abroad, the provisions would be more inclusive than if they were not involved.

Indirect effects.

The factors which influence the inclusiveness of the citizenship policy are not likely to be independent of one another. For example, a relationship between the feeling of cultural threat and the size of the minority is quite possible. A minority that is ten percent of the population may be seen as less

of a cultural threat than one that is thirty percent. Therefore, a larger minority could actually make exclusion *more likely* by feeding into the cultural threat factor. In small countries, such as the Baltic states, this kind of effect of a large minority is quite likely. Therefore, the possible relationship between size of minority and cultural threat needs to be kept in mind.

The existence of a large minority may also affect the interest of a neighboring country. Members of an ethnic group are likely to follow how members of the same group are treated in other countries. If the ethnic group is a majority of a neighboring country (Russia, for example), the government of that neighbor may feel pressure to intervene in the situation. The threats of a large, neighboring state could also prompt action by the international community. Because international organizations cannot monitor all policies everywhere, they are likely to focus on those which are *visibly* problematic and which affect regional stability. Lieven (1993, 379) was told, for example, that the CSCE did not have missions in Latvia because "Latvia has not passed its citizenship law yet, and the Russians haven't complained as much about Latvia yet." A diplomat pointed out to him that "Diplomacy tends to be led by events; it is difficult to drum up support to deal with a problem that hasn't happened yet." Events in Latvia in late 1993 and early 1994 gave even more support to this. The CSCE became directly involved in Latvia but only because Russia stepped up its pressure on Latvia.

The final indirect effect involves perception of threat to the nation and the role of the emigre community. Above, I hypothesized that emigres would support more inclusive laws making it easier for them and their families to become citizens. This hypothesis is open to criticism, particularly when survival of the nation is uncertain. Emigres are often the most extreme nationalists found in any ethno-national group. It is quite possible, therefore, that emigres would push for exclusion when the inclusion would be of an ethnic minority. They may even argue against certain provisions (e.g. dual citizenship) that, while making their acquisition of citizenship easier, would be undesirable due their inclusive effects on citizenship of the "other." Therefore, a perception of threat to the survival of the nation would have a negative effect on the emigre community's support of an inclusive law.

Figure 2 displays the variables, the expected direction of influence, and the interaction among the explanatory factors. Thus, Figure 2 contains this study's "model" of what affects citizenship policy inclusiveness in newly independent states. It is meant as a summary of the hypothesized relationships, but Figure 2, of course, is not a theory. As Motyl (1992) states, a model simply points out the relationships between the variables. It shows *how* variables are related. It does not, by itself, *explain why* these relationships are as they are. This is the role of theory and, for this project, the role of the discussion about the likely affects of the variables.[8]

[Figure 2 about here]

An economic answer to the question of citizenship inclusiveness?

By now, a historian familiar with works on the increase in inclusiveness of citizenship policies over time is probably wondering about the absence of industrialization (and resulting working class power) as an explanatory variable. After all, it has been argued that, in countries such as Britain, citizenship inclusiveness increased as classes pressed for political participation and elites saw increases in inclusion as a way to maximize, or protect, their own power. As Bendix (1964, 74) puts it, "When political developments are attributed to economic determinants, the changing position of the lower classes and the emergence of national citizenship appear as by-products of industrialization. This line of interpretation develops at the end of the eighteenth century." Bendix actually feels that the extension of voting rights was affected more "by the international position of the country, by conceptions of what the proper distribution in the national community ought to be, and by the give and take of the political struggle" (Bendix 1964, 88). Yet, if economic development affected citizenship inclusiveness as others claim, perhaps the level of development of a newly independent state should be considered.

Whether one accepts the economic development argument that appears in works on the historical development of citizenship or not does not affect this project. This variable is not part of my model for two reasons. First, works which focus on the historical evolution of citizenship and claim to

Figure 2 — A MODEL OF THE VARIABLES AFFECTING THE EXCLUSIVENESS OF CITIZENSHIP POLICIES IN NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES



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explain the inclusiveness of citizenship tend actually to be about the extension of *certain rights that one may associate with citizens* (civil, political, or social rights) to a broader segment of the population. Bendix himself confuses the two ideas using concepts such as citizenship inclusiveness and "the distribution and redistribution of rights and duties" as well as citizenship and "the rights of citizenship" interchangeably (Bendix 1964, 88, 92). His work, *Nation-Building and Citizenship*, would be better titled, *Nation-Building and the Extension of Rights to the Lower Classes*. Second, denying people official membership in the state because of their economic class is simply not a viable option in post-Communist states (though naturalization requirements may include a clear source of income). Even if one could argue that citizenship as membership was affected by industrialization in the 1800s and early 1900s, the world has changed. This variable is no longer a factor in citizenship inclusiveness.

THE EXAMINATION OF CITIZENSHIP POLICY IN ESTONIA AND LITHUANIA

Estonia and Lithuania as cases.

Estonia and Lithuania are both Baltic states, were both former Soviet republics, and both contain a significant Russian minority. Yet, their citizenship policies differed. The discussion below will demonstrate the relationship between this variation and the factors discussed above.

These cases were selected because of the variation in inclusiveness. This begs the question of "selecting on the dependent variable." There are two reasons why warnings from Geddes (1990) about this practice do not apply to this study. First, while she is often cited as claiming any selection on the dependent variable is problematic, I feel this goes beyond what her article shows. Her examples point to the problem of choosing cases at one end of a spectrum and inferring to the entire spectrum. This is clearly a problem, but the way to avoid it is not to choose cases randomly (which may get you the same result) but to choose cases carefully. Lithuania and Estonia, while not the most extreme cases, were chosen for this study precisely because they fell at varying points across the inclusiveness spectrum.

The second reason her argument is not detrimental to these cases is the nature of the case studies in this project. They do not serve as a final test of the generalizability (external validity) of the model. Rather, they demonstrate and help refine the model. While studies with numerous cases have an advantage in terms of generalizability, comparative case studies have an advantage over "large N" studies in terms of internal validity. Theory always drives the causal explanations in a study such as this. Yet, it makes little sense to test the model and theory in a general way until it is clear that it makes sense in a few cases, examined in detail. Mohr (1985) makes a rousing defense of the case study in terms of *both* internal and external validity. His argument is strongest, however, when it focuses on the value of case studies for internal validity. The following point is the main justification for the use of comparative case studies in this project prior to any larger statistical tests for generalizability:

> Nevertheless, external validity can hardly be a legitimate issue until internal validity--the truth of the statement made about the subjects and events that are actually observed--is positively settled; one cannot get very excited about generalizing an invalid conclusion. Internal validity in the case study must therefore be an issue, as well (Mohr 1985, 67).

In addition to variation in the dependent variable, these cases also have unique features that deserve detailed analysis. It took nearly a year after independence for the Estonian government to adopt a citizenship policy. Lithuania, on the other hand, adopted its first citizenship policy while it was still a republic in the Soviet Union and before it even officially declared sovereignty or independence. In addition, the percentage of the population in Estonia which is ethnically Russian is significantly larger than the Russian (or even Russian *and* Polish) minority in Lithuania. Even culturally these states have many differences. Lithuanians are mainly Roman Catholic and religion is very important in their self-identity. Estonians are generally Lutheran and religion is less important as a marker of their ethnic identity than language. These differences are valuable in justifying the usefulness of comparing only two states. If the same variables are important in states with these unique features, it enhances the claim that one is justified in examining these variables in a more detached way on numerous cases.

Sources.

This study employs data from personal interviews with prominent elites, government documents and other primary sources from the states, and survey results. Data were collected during trips in the summer of 1993 and spring of 1994. The survey results will be used to show mass attitudes. This will complement the otherwise elite-centered approach of these comparative case studies.

Political elites, journalists, and members of the academic community with knowledge of the citizenship debate and explanatory variables that I am examining were interviewed. I discussed citizenship policy in Lithuania and Estonia with politicians in the ruling coalitions and oppositions, leaders of the Russian communities, members of nationalist organizations (the "Congress of Estonia," for example), representatives from the CSCE missions in Tallinn and Narva, and academics who have followed the citizenship debate. Unfortunately, those who were most directly involved in framing the citizenship policy tended also to be in high positions of power in the government. In Estonia, these individuals were quite busy due to passage of the "Aliens Law" as well as votes by Russian dominated cities in the northeast for autonomy. Several of them, however, did take the time to respond to a mailed questionnaire.

CITIZENSHIP IN LITHUANIA

The Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian republic passed a law on citizenship on November 3, 1989. Since Lithuania was still part of the Soviet Union, the citizenship guidelines technically were for the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (LiSSR). Like its Estonian counterpart, the Lithuanian law contained a provision basing automatic citizenship on the pre-Soviet period. The law began by stating that all persons who had been citizens prior to June 15, 1940 and all their descendants living in Lithuania were automatically citizens (see the law, "O Grazhdanstve Litovskoi SSR" 1989, Art. 1).

In addition, however, the law contained two provisions which broadened the base of initial citizens. First, all permanent residents born in Lithuania or those who could show one of their parents or grandparents was born there were also granted automatic citizenship, provided they did not have citizenship from another country. Second, those residing on the territory that did not meet the other criteria could still become automatic citizens by signing, within two years, a loyalty declaration stating that they would support the Lithuanian constitution and the laws of the Lithuanian SSR as well as "respect its state sovereignty and territorial integrity" (see Girnius 1991, 21; Brubaker 1992b, 281; and the law, "O Grazhdanstve Litovskoi SSR" 1989, Art. 1). According to a treaty between Lithuania and Russia in July 1991, this option of citizenship without naturalization was extended also to those who entered Lithuania after November 1989 but before the signing of the treaty (see Ginsburgs 1993). There was no language requirement for those choosing this option under the 1989 law and 1991 treaty.

Taking Lithuanian citizenship, however, meant renouncing Soviet citizenship. This feature of the law sparked some of the most intense debate. The final solution was a compromise. While the law officially stated that Lithuanian citizenship could not be held with that of another state, citizens were to carry USSR passports until "full state sovereignty" was regained ("After Heated Debate" 1989, 27). The lack of dual citizenship was made more explicit by a law passed in April 1991.

Naturalization was possible by showing a knowledge of the Lithuanian language, maintaining permanent residence for ten years, possessing a permanent source of income, promising to obey and showing a knowledge of the Lithuanian constitution, and signing a loyalty statement similar to automatic citizens but also stating a respect for Lithuania's state "language, culture, customs, and traditions" (Brubaker 1992b, 280 and the law "O Grazhdanstve Litovskoi SSR" 1989, Art. 15).

While the naturalization demands were not easy, the requirements for automatic citizenship were quite inclusive. Nearly everyone was eligible for citizenship under these guidelines. Out of a population of over 3 1/2 million, roughly only 350,000 permanent residents did not receive citizenship before the two year period expired. There is some thought that administrative problems may have kept this number form being even lower (Ginsburgs 1993, 238). The failure to acquire citizenship by these people,

however, appears to be due more to choice or ignorance than to legal exclusion. Perhaps some felt that keeping Soviet citizenship meant remaining "loyal to your fatherland and clear in your beliefs" (*Izvestiya* April 20, 1991, p. 2), or they dreaded "losing contact with the native land and loved ones" (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta* July 16, 1992, p. 3). More likely, according to those with whom I spoke in Vilnius, many people may have not known that they had to register to become a citizen or they feared a reversal in the drive to independence and reprisals against those who gave up their Soviet citizenship.

With the end of the two year period and with independence a reality, a new citizenship law was put in place. On December 5, 1991, the 1989 citizenship law was replaced by a new law passed by the Sajudis-controlled parliament. The major difference between this law and the 1989 law was the elimination of automatic citizenship for permanent residents, while those who were citizens of Lithuania before 1940 were still granted citizenship without naturalization. A resolution passed the next day made it clear that, once again, obtaining Lithuanian citizenship meant that citizenship of the Soviet Union was considered invalid for that person by the Lithuanian government (see the Supreme Council resolution, "On the Procedure for Implementing the Republic of Lithuania Law on Citizenship" 1991, Art. 7).

Naturalization requirements were similar to the 1989 law. As outlined in Article 12 of the law, naturalization required passing a written and spoken test in Lithuanian, permanent residence in Lithuania for ten years, employment or a constant legal source of income from within Lithuania, knowledge of the Lithuanian constitution, and renunciation of prior citizenship. New citizens also had to take an oath similar to the one in the 1989 law. One difference in the naturalization articles in the two laws was a line inserted at the end of Article 12 in the 1991 law. After the naturalization requirements, the article concluded with "Persons meeting the conditions specified in this Article shall be granted citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania *taking into consideration the interests of the Republic of Lithuania*" ("Law on Citizenship" 1991, Art. 12, my italics). This statement seemed to open the door for the refusal of naturalization even for those who met the requirements, though there has been no protest, to my knowledge, claiming denial of naturalization for qualified applicants.

In November 1992, the Lithuanian Supreme Council simplified the procedures for citizenship of children and grandchildren of ethnic Lithuanians living outside Lithuania ("Supreme Soviet Ends Last Session; Creates Army, Amends Citizenship Law" 1992, 59). In December 1993, another amendment affecting the emigre community was passed. It allowed dual citizenship in some cases (dual citizenship amendments had been defeated in July 1993). Article 18 (dealing with the *restoration* of Lithuanian citizenship) originally required the applicant to refuse citizenship of the state of residence. In addition, according to paragraph 3 of Article 18, the emigres' children who had acquired citizenship of another state by birth were not eligible for automatic restoration. The 1993 amendment removed these provisions, allowing a greater number of emigres to receive automatic citizenship. The other amendment to the law was passed in July 1993. It allowed for naturalization without a language test for those 65 or older or those with certain disabilities (blindness, deafness, etc.).

Effects of the variables: perceptions about "the nation."

An ethnically defined nation.

Partly because of the Soviet legacy of nationality classification, in Lithuania the nation is defined in ethnic terms. While Russians can be citizens of Lithuania, they are not considered Lithuanians. As Erika Umbrasaite, a journalist for *Europos Lietuvis*, told me, "There is no real desire to develop 'Lithuanian' into a civic concept. Poles are not seen as Lithuanian even if they have citizenship. They are Poles with Lithuanian citizenship." This lack of a civic idea of nation is reflected in some of the provisions of the policy allowing easier acquisition of citizenship for ethnic Lithuanians (see above).

Lithuania as a nation-state.

Lithuania is seen by Lithuanians as a homeland for the ethnic nation more than a country like the United States is seen as a the homeland of a given ethnic group. The idea of Lithuania first and foremost as a national homeland, however, has not been stressed a great deal by elites in Lithuania. This was

especially true of the elites setting the citizenship policy in 1989. Thus, while a law exists proclaiming Lithuanian the "official" state language, even today the multinational character of state is discussed as something that does not need to be changed. As Severinas Vaitiekus, vice-director of the government's Department of Nationalities, stated to me, "In our blood we have no such idea of 'Lithuania for Lithuanians.' Our history taught people to live together in a multicultural society." This idea is also indicated by the way Lithuanians, in writing on the history of Lithuania, seem to stress the multinational character of the territory to a greater extent than similar works by Estonians (see for example the government publications, *National Minorities in Lithuania* 1992 and *Lithuania* 1994). Even the national anthem stresses Lithuania as a homeland but does not mention for whom. The last line reads, "May the love of Lithuania brightly burn in our hearts. For the sake of this land, let unity blossom."

Threat to survival of the nation.

Given the size of the minorities and the relatively constant level of ethnic Lithuanians as a percentage of the population, there has been little discussion in Lithuania of "survival." As Vilius Kavaliauskas, press secretary of the Seimas (Lithuanian parliament) put it to me, "The situation is different than in Estonia and Latvia. There is no threat to the majority from the minority here. When you are not threatened as a nation, you can afford to be democratic." Irenijus Cerkasovas, head of the Special Commission on the Questions of Citizenship, added, "I think there is no such threat in Lithuania...and, in general, there is no such attitude that the minority poses some kind of threat."

This does not mean that some members of Lithuanian society do not see the Russians and others who came after 1940 as colonists. According to Vaitiekus, there were some efforts in 1991 when the new citizenship law was being discussed to take citizenship away from this group. This effort had little support, however, even among the more nationalistic elements of the Sajudis leadership. While these sentiments are not supported as they are in Latvia and Estonia, they continue to exist for a few in Lithuania. A public letter (sent officially to the president, the Seimas, and the prime minister) in January 1994 from members of the "Parliamentary Group of Political Prisoners and Deportees" criticized the inclusive features of the Lithuanian law and overall policy:

> The provisions for obtaining Lithuanian citizenship have been amended in such a way that those who persecuted, garroted and executed participants of the Lithuanian resistance are being retroactively honored by their citizenship, obtained through deceit and the indifference of officials, legitimized... The house of state, which is being built by collaborators, conformists, and quislings, has no foundation and is illegitimate in a supreme moral sense ("Concerning a Threat to the Foundations of the Lithuanian State" 1994, 1).

Role of the minority.

The non-Lithuanians in Lithuania had little to do with the 1989 citizenship law. Most of the Russians in Lithuania were supportive of drives for independence and a majority considered Lithuania to be their homeland. In a poll conducted by the Lithuanian State Ethnic Affairs Center in 1991, 56 percent of Russians considered Lithuania to be their homeland. 75 percent of these were citizens. Most of them did not want to leave Lithuania (see "Russians Consider Lithuania Their Homeland" 1991, 6). It is possible, however, that the Lithuanian leaders did have in mind the protests over the 1989 language law. In February 1989, several months before the passage of the citizenship law, a rally organized by the pro-Moscow group *Edinstvo* drew up to 80,000 according to *Sovietskaya Litva* (February 14, 1989, 3).

The minority communities had a much clearer impact, however, on the July 1993 amendment which waived language requirements for certain people. According to Vaitiekus, the amendment itself was suggested by the "Board of National Communities" whose members come from organizations in the various ethnic communities. The amendment was also supported by the Department of Nationalities.

The powerful neighbor.

Since Lithuania's 1989 law was passed while it was still part of the Soviet Union, pressure from

a "powerful neighbor" at the time of passage took the form of pressure from the central government of the USSR. While some of this did occur, Moscow was more concerned with the need for such a law at all rather than its inclusiveness. TASS reported central government displeasure with "controversial new laws that it said contravened the country's constitution" and some officials were especially concerned with the loyalty oath (Ginsburgs 1990, 15, 18). Moscow demanded the 1989 law be overturned (Ginsburgs 1992, 13). In April 1990, Gorbachev and Ryzhkov called a Lithuanian law establishing clearer guidelines for certifying Lithuanian citizens discriminatory and "against Soviet citizens who want to live and work according to USSR constitutional procedures and laws" (*Izvestiya* April 14, 1990, p. 1). In turn, Moscow announced the goods blockade, indicating that even more serious action from the center would have occurred if the 1989 law had been more exclusive. This certainly was understood in Lithuania. Yet, Lithuania did not back down on citizenship after central government action.

Comments from *Russia* about Lithuania were generally positive. Russia did push for the automatic citizenship provision in the 1991 treaty mentioned above. This treaty allowed between 2,000 and 3,000 Russians to be eligible for citizenship without naturalization. Overall, however, the Yeltsin government has praised Lithuania's policy. At a late 1992 Yeltsin-Landsbergis meeting, for example, the Russian leader did not criticize the Lithuanian treatment of ethnic minorities (see "Landsbergis Speaks With Yeltsin on Troops, Minorities" 1992, 73).

The emigre community.

Lithuanian emigres have played a role in changing the citizenship policy. Provisions for citizenship for family members and the possibility of dual citizenship were confusing to many Lithuanians abroad. In March 1992, representatives from Lithuanian communities in Canada, Hungary, Belgium, and other countries met with representatives of the Supreme Council and Sajudis. This discussion took place after the 1991 law was "met with criticism by the emigrees" ("Citizens, Emigrees Want Law Explained" 1992, 60). The representatives of the emigre communities pointed out that while there was not a feeling that the 1991 citizenship law was a bad law, but that there was "a lack of information explaining the law" ("Citizens, Emigrees Want Law Explained" 1992, 60). According to Vaitiekus, there was some anger in the emigre community over the lack of dual citizenship. They felt that they had fought for Lithuanian independence while abroad and now where being snubbed by the government. Using this argument and the 1992 meeting, emigres helped push through amendments in November 1992 and December 1993.

CITIZENSHIP IN ESTONIA

As early as 1988, debate over the issue of citizenship was heard in Estonia (see for example, *Pravda* August 30, 1988, p. 3; *Izvestiya* October 19, 1988, p. 2; and *Sovietskaya Estonia* March 7, 1989, p. 3). Unlike Lithuania, however, Estonia did not pass a citizenship law prior to independence. The Estonian government did push forward with the idea, however, once independence was achieved. Less than a month after the failed Soviet coup solidified Baltic independence, the Estonian special commission on citizenship submitted a draft law to the Supreme Council. Like the law that emerged in Lithuania, this draft law was quite inclusive regarding the initial base of citizens.

According to the first proposal, the initial population of citizens would come from two groups. First, those who were citizens before June 16, 1940, and their descendants would be granted automatic citizenship. Second, those who were permanent residents on the date that the "transition period to full independence" began could apply for citizenship and have two of the naturalization requirements, competence in the Estonian language and 10 years of residency, waived. Naturalization would be possible for others by fulfilling the requirements above as well as taking an oath of loyalty. The draft law would have eliminated the automatic citizenship of spouses (a key clause due to intermarriage) but would have allowed mothers to pass on citizenship as well as fathers (the interwar law allowed only fathers to pass citizenship to descendants). While the naturalization requirements of the draft law were difficult, the provisions for new citizens were quite inclusive. Most of the non-Estonian population would have had an opportunity to become citizens with little difficulty.

With its inclusive provisions, this draft was very controversial. It was amended on the floor of the Supreme Council to such an extent that the special committee on citizenship removed it from consideration. Only a week after submitting the first proposal, the citizenship commission announced that a new draft law would be submitted. This second version called for automatic citizenship only for pre-1940 citizens and their descendants. All others had to be naturalized and the waivers in the first draft for the language and 10 year residency requirements were eliminated (Kionka 1991, 25).

Exclusive guidelines for automatic citizenship were made law on February 26, 1992, when a resolution of the Supreme Council reinstated the 1938 citizenship law. This resolution differed from the second draft law in two important ways. First, those not receiving automatic citizenship could apply for citizenship after two years of permanent residency. One year after application, assuming the language requirement was met, they would be granted citizenship. Second, the two years of residency could begin only after March 30, 1990 (Brubaker 1992b, 282). Thus, someone not given automatic citizenship could become a citizen on March 30, 1993 (two years plus a year after application) at earliest. Until that time, even those who had lived their entire lives in Estonia, but could not trace their roots back to interwar Estonia, were foreigners. In addition, the language requirements for naturalization were unclear in the law. It appeared initially that there would be room for discretion of local government officials, but clearer language guidelines were established in 1993 (see section below on the effects of Europe). Dual citizenship was not allowed.

The reinstated 1938 law did contain two provisions to grant automatic citizenship to a broader base. First, ethnic Estonians could have residency and language requirements waived. Second, the so-called "special merits clause" in Article 7 of the law allowed simplified procedures for residents with "special merits." In April 1992, a resolution was passed calling on various unions, the Academy of Sciences, and colleges to submit suggestions of such "special" people. Because of the potential for non-Estonians to receive automatic citizenship through this provision, however, it came under attack from ethno-nationalists within Estonia (see "Party Questions Citizenship Referendum" 1992, 69). This clause became important in the 1993 local elections in Estonia where selected Russian candidates, favorable to Tallinn, were granted citizenship so they could run for office (See Laitin 1993). Article 7 of the 1938 law also allowed waiver of the language requirement for those who lived *without citizenship* in Estonia for ten years. Since the 1992 resolution set 1990 as the starting point for residency, most non-citizens could apply without a language test in 2000. This point is not stressed in Estonian government documents on the citizenship issue which focus on "special merits" and ethnic Estonian status (see, for example, "Estonian Law on Citizenship" 1993). Finally, it is important to note that the characteristics outlined in Article 7 *may* allow one to avoid naturalization requirements. There is no guarantee; the decision rests with the Estonian government.

At least two inclusive amendments to the law have been adopted since its passage. On February 18, 1993 (signed by the president on March 6), a provision was added that anyone who registered for citizenship prior to the elections of the Congress of Estonia would have the residence and language requirements for naturalization waived. In addition, an amendment on March 23, 1993 (signed by the president on April 6), reinstated one of the original draft law provisions: the passage of citizenship through the maternal side as well as the paternal side for those with roots to pre-1940 citizens. While these provisions did not add significantly to those who could receive automatic citizenship, they were steps toward inclusiveness.[9]

Effects of the variables: perceptions about "the nation."

An ethnically defined nation.

To those who study central Europe and the former USSR, it is no surprise to hear that Estonians define their nation in ethnic terms. To many Americans, however, it is strange to discuss a group such as "non-Estonian citizens of Estonia." Yet, this is precisely how the small group of ethnic Russians who have citizenship are labeled. In part because of the legacy of Soviet nationalities policy, the Estonian nation is an ethnic, not political, idea. Some with whom I spoke in Estonia saw the nation not as defined

by blood but by culture. Yet, even this does not limit the ethnic character of the nation. One can become Estonian only by adopting the Estonian language and customs. There is no idea of merging cultural features of non-Estonians into this cultural nation or defining "Estonian" based on loyalty to the state.

Estonia as a nation-state of ethnic Estonians.

More than in Lithuania, the titular population of Estonia sees its state first and foremost as *its* homeland, not as a multinational state. The state is not only the realm of politics but the protector of the nation, ethnically defined. Thus, the Estonian Constitution opens with, "Unwavering in their faith and with an unswerving will to safeguard and develop a state which is based on the inextinguishable right of the Estonian people (note--not people of Estonia--LB) to national self-determination...which shall guarantee the preservation of the Estonian nation and its culture throughout the ages..." (see "Republic of Estonia Constitution" 1992, preamble). The large minority population, on the other hand, is seen more as a consequence of the Soviet period, which requires altering, than a natural feature of Estonian society. A member of the Estonian Institute for Human Rights stated, in response to my question on Estonia as a nation-state, "Certainly Estonia as a country is the only homeland for Estonians, we do not have any other country where we should feel (at) home." Peet Kask, a member of the special committee which produced the draft citizenship laws, told me that the final version of the law "did reflect the attitude 'Estonia for Estonians," although the rhetoric has sometimes been different." Stepan (1992) points out the role of the idea of "nation-state" in Estonia's citizenship policy. Yet, he misses the point that the "nation-state" idea by itself is not a factor. With an ethnic definition of the nation, however, the concept of "nation-state" has encouraged exclusive approaches to policies such as citizenship.

At the mass level, links between support for Estonian independence and a desire to live and work in a mono-ethnic setting indicate mass support for an ethnically defined nation within a nation-state. A majority of Estonians in a 1991 survey favored living and working in a mono-ethnic setting (according to Silver and Titma forthcoming, Table 4-5, 932 respondents stated a desire to live in a mono-ethnic neighborhood while only 14 preferred a multiethnic setting; 897 preferred a mono-ethnic workplace with 34 respondents favoring a multiethnic working environment). Of those favoring a mono-ethnic neighborhoods and workplaces, two-thirds were "pro-independence" while around 40 percent of the multiethnic group were "pro-independence"

Threat to survival of the nation.

While Estonians view their state more as an ethnic homeland than Lithuanians, this fact alone cannot explain the significant difference in inclusiveness of automatic citizenship provisions in Lithuania and Estonia. The final perception related to the idea of "nation," degree of threat, however, is quite telling. Large decreases in the percentage of titular nationality in Estonia during the Soviet period fueled ideas by political elites and academics that the nation was "dying out." These feelings (and the consequences for citizenship) are shown by statements from the Congress of Estonia, a representative body elected by citizens of interwar Estonia and their descendants which acted as an alternative to the Estonian Supreme Soviet from the late 1980s until the election of the Riigikogu. One resolution stated:

> Subsequent to its annexation of the Republic of Estonia, the Soviet Union organized extensive immigration by its citizens into Estonia. As a result of this, non-citizens form over one-third of the population of Estonia, *which is now threatening the preservation of the native population of Estonia* and the security and unity of the entire Estonian nation...Before the elections to the Riigikogu, the body of citizens can only be extended by persons *who are of Estonian ethnic origin* or who applied for Republic of Estonia citizenship before the elections to the Congress of Estonia ("Congress of Estonia Position on the Immigrants from the Former USSR Residing in the Republic of Estonia" 1992, my italics).

Additional support for the view that Estonian elites held such positions on the ideas of "nation" comes from political scientist Oleg Samorodny. He told me not only that the nation is defined in cultural terms

but that a fear of cultural disintegration exists. It is part of the "complex" that Estonia has as a small nation. Members of the ruling Fatherland Party also mentioned to me this idea of smallness. They saw the Russians in Estonia first and foremost as part of the larger Russian nation and asked me how one million people could discriminate against 150 million. They claimed that giving citizenship automatically to Russian residents would set the stage for Estonia to become "a Russian province."

Here, the differences between Lithuania and Estonia cannot be overemphasized. As Brubaker (1992b, 285) himself states, "the national movement in Lithuania sought to restore the Lithuanian state, not to save the Lithuanian nation." In Estonia, however, nationalists felt independence was more than regaining sovereignty; it was a matter of cultural survival.

At the mass level, worries about "national survival" are indicated by the over 90 percent of Estonian respondents who saw migration into Estonia as a very serious or serious problem. Only 50 percent of Russian respondents felt the same way (see Silver and Titma forthcoming, Table 4-7). No other problem (10 were mentioned) had such a wide difference in "very serious" responses between Russian and Estonian respondents. The differences between Russians and Estonians are significant since, in addition to Estonian representatives in the Riigikogu being more likely to follow the views of their ethnic Estonian counterparts in the general population, ethnic Estonians had greater "mass political activeness" than ethnic Russians (see Dowley, Silver, and Uuekula forthcoming, Figure 6-2B).

Other explanations for the seeming importance of "nation" perceptions?

While the ideas of Estonians as an ethnic and threatened nation and Estonia as a nation-state were often discussed by elites in Estonia, the exclusiveness of the Estonian law was *officially* justified in non-ethnic terms. The date 1940 was chosen, according to the government, not because most of the Russians came after that but because it marked the beginning of the Soviet occupation. Yet, other comments indicate that an ethnic definition of the nation was at the heart of the citizenship debate in Estonia. Rein Taagepera, the Estonian-American who ran for president of Estonia, stated during the election that, while more "Russian-speaking residents" should be granted citizenship, Estonia "would not like" to accept too many Russians as citizens ("Candidate Favors Citizenship for Russians" 1992, 53-54). This comment indicates that, rhetoric aside, citizenship is an ethnic issue in Estonia.

Some in Estonia provide another argument that the exclusive provisions were not a sign of the power of ethnic nationalism. In fact, they claim, the changes were made from the first to second drafts because the situation in Estonia simply changed. Real independence (and thus the ability to adopt a "restored state" approach to citizenship) became a real possibility around the time the first draft was completed. As Arno Allman (one of the three people who negotiated Yeltsin's recognition of Estonian independence) said to me, "the 1991 drafts were different models for independence. The idea of continuity simply prevailed." While it is important that the USSR was falling apart, this does not explain *why support existed* for the "restored state" approach, which sought to undo the Soviet legacy by de-colonizing Estonia, given the opportunity to implement such policies. Those who claim it was a matter of timing are correct, but only to the extent that the new climate allowed those stressing the idea of an ethnically defined and threatened nation and of Estonia as a nation-state to carry the day.

The Congress of Estonia, already seen by many as the only legitimate parliamentary body, became even more powerful following the failed coup. It is no accident that the second draft law on citizenship looked very much like most of the pre-independence positions of the Congress. These elites, with their positions on the Estonian state and nation, dominated the discourse on citizenship in late 1991 and early 1992. As Peet Kask wrote to me, "There has been a permanent trend towards national radicalization in the political life in Estonia. The most significant jump towards radicalization occurred after Estonian independence was recognized in August-September 1991. Before independence too radical ideas were evidently impractical. Therefore draft laws on citizenship of May and June 1991 were liberal...The situation changed when the independence of the state was internationally recognized. After that event, the 'restitutional' (nationalistic) ideology has gained more and more support...It was obvious that the more liberal solutions to the problem were impossible to adopt."

The Russian minority in Estonia.

When the 1992 citizenship law was passed, many Estonian nationalists were upset at the short period of residency required for naturalization. While officially the provision for two years of residency plus one year of application processing time was justified as a continuation of the 1938 citizenship law, the residency requirement could have been more lengthy. Some regard the restoration of the 1938 guidelines, therefore, as a "compromise between the interests of the indigenous population and the non-Estonians residing there" ("Estonia Defines Its Citizenry" 1992, 2). Perhaps the Estonian leaders had in mind protests from the Russian community over attempts in 1989 to limit local election participation to those who had lived in Estonia for more than five years (see Ginsburgs 1992, 9-10).

Despite sentiments from Estonian nationalists that the law was too inclusive, most non-Estonians felt the lack of automatic citizenship was discriminatory. They disliked waiting for the ability to naturalize and feared the language requirements. To protest, Russians in Estonia both worked through the political system and displayed unconventional behavior. The non-citizens formed several movements including the Russian National Party, the Party of the Working People of Estonia, and the Russian Democratic Movement of Estonia (RDME). Yuri Hertzman, a member of the RDME Central Council, argued for an inclusive law to allow "social construction" and against language requirements since "Formation of a multilingual society is not a momentary, but a long term process" ("Parliament on Non-Indigenous Citizenship" 1992, 67). The RDME also published its own version of a citizenship application that it encouraged non-citizens to fill in and send to the Estonian government (see "RDME: 'On Citizenship'" 1992, 27). There were even calls for a "noncitizens representative assembly" because of the perceived lack of representation of the Estonian parliament ("Noncitizens Representative Assembly Talks Noted" 1992, 57).[10] The Russians in Estonia also turned to unconventional means of expressing their discontent with their exclusion from automatic citizenship. In April 1992, a two hour "warning strike" in the northeast demonstrated the resolve of the non-citizens ("Russians Reportedly 'Running Out of Patience'" 1992, 83). The Russians also discussed secession from Estonia and linked the situation in Estonia to the violence between Slavs and the native population in Moldova.

In Estonia, the threats of strikes, and even secession, should have had some effect because the Russians are concentrated in the northeast (up to 95 percent of the urban population in this part of the country are Russian) and dominate the industrial workforce in this area. The Baltic Russians are more urban than the titular populations in all three states (Schroeder 1990, 45), and these urban areas are important to the economy and daily life in each state. Northeastern Estonian cities such as Narva and Sillamae are industrial centers with, among other things, important power plants. A long term strike in these areas could cripple the Estonian economy. Thus, the demonstration strike was an important signal to the Estonian government, and the commission set up to look at non-citizen issues was a sign that the government recognizes the potential damage of strikes, violence, or moves toward secession.

Yet, overall, the actions of Russians in Estonia appeared to have had only small effects on policy. Threats of economic action and votes for autonomy by local Russians brought few results and no direct changes in the citizenship policy. (One of the biggest results was the participation of the RDME and other Russian groups on a parliament-sponsored commission studying the issue of non-citizens). The attitude of Estonian officials toward the Russian action in the northeast indicated that it was more of an irritant than an action that resulted in the law being changed. Here, the relationship between the minority and the perception of a cultural threat may be at work. More important, however, was the timing of the Russian protests. Only *after* the citizenship law was passed did serious Russian threats and action take place.[11]

Pressure from Russia.

After the passage of the 1992 citizenship law, Russia criticized Estonia's treatment of ethnic minorities. Officials in Moscow made claims of discrimination and threatened action in response to the "oppression" of Russians. Some called for amendments to the bilateral treaty between Estonia and

Russia and discussed economic sanctions ("Ethnic Russians Subject to Discrimination" 1992, 73). The Russian Foreign Ministry has made some of the strongest comments. In September 1992, a ministry official stated that "Russia cannot indifferently observe and not react to the violations of of the rights of ethnic Russians in Estonia" ("'Sources' Expect Russian Action on Ethnic Issue" 1992, 55). Russian newspapers have also taken strong stands against Estonia. An article in *Rossiiskaya Gazeta* discussed the likelihood of "confrontation" in the "northeast of a *little* state on the very border of its *giant* neighbor" (see "Russians Reportedly 'Running Out of Patience'" 1992, 84, my italics). At a seminar in September 1992 at the Moscow International Relations Institute, more specific comments were heard:

> Economic sanctions, recognized by the international public, are an efficient weapon. But their use should be considered in each individual case. Regarding the use of force, as a historian and an expert in international relations I can say that force cannot solve all problems. But in the situation we are presently entering, force could solve quite a lot...Even now we shall have to prepare the public and international organisations for recognizing the possibility of the use of force in legal limits by Russia and other legal subjects of the CIS. We do not have many options. But we shall have to use them. After all, we are not such a terribly exhausted nation ("Human Rights: Russia's New Justification for Interference" 1993, 9).

As late as October 20, 1993, Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev stated that Russian troops will not be removed from Estonia until the rights of Russians are guaranteed. According to Grachev, without treaties with Russia protecting the Russian-speakers, "we will stay until these problems are solved" ("Troops Will Not Leave, Grachov Says" 1993, 3).

Such pressure from Russia should have made an inclusive policy more likely. It appears that it did not. Peet Kask stated to me that, after the recognition of Estonian independence, "Russia's pressure has had little effect or even (a) counterproductive effect." There are several possible reasons for this. First, as Oleg Samorodny told me, the effect of Russian pressure was limited due to the anti-Russian feelings of Estonian leaders and the population. Second, the pressure on Estonia from Russia has undoubtedly worried Estonian officials, but, like the actions of Russians in Estonia, most of this pressure came only *after* passage of the initial post-independence citizenship law. The first draft of this law looked very inclusive. The exclusive changes came quickly and probably took the Russian government off guard. This, combined with Russia having its own concerns in early 1992, meant the Russians did not press the Estonians on citizenship until after nationalist forces managed to push through a more exclusive draft of the law. Finally, there is some feeling in Estonia that Russia has too many economic problems to begin pushing tough sanctions. Arno Allman told me that it is unlikely Russia will take serious action and that threats are just part of internal Russian politics. While this ignores the real changes resulting from this internal Russian debate (Yeltsin delaying troop withdrawal, for example), it does indicate that the effectiveness of Russian threats is limited. To be effective, threats must be believed; it appears that the Estonian leaders may not be taking these threats seriously.

European organizations.

At least three changes in the citizenship policy appear to be the direct result of the actions of the European representatives and a desire on the part of the Estonians to listen to their suggestions. First, as mentioned above, the provisions for naturalization were open to interpretation, especially regarding the language test. A CSCE report in September 1992 stated, "Commission staffers got the impression that procedures for obtaining citizenship, if not entirely clear in statute, may be even less clearly applied in practice" ("Russians in Estonia: Problems and Prospects" 1992, 4). Better defined guidelines for the language test and assurances that local officials would not arbitrarily deny citizenship to qualified applicants were needed. Just two months after the publication of this report, the prime minister of Estonia announced that no arbitrariness would be permissible ("Prime Minister Forbids the Discussion of Ousting 'Russian-Speakers'" 1992, 71). Second, another CSCE report called for easier naturalization

for elderly and disabled applicants (see "Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission" 1992, 19). A statement by Max van der Stoel, CSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, echoed these sentiments:

> As far as the requirements for citizenships are concerned, the Government intends to take concrete steps in the near future to ensure that the recommendations made on this subject by the High Commissioner on National Minorities last April will be put into effect. Directives will be issued to ensure that the language requirements will not exceed the ability to conduct a simple conversation in Estonian and that the requirements will be even lower for persons over 60 and invalids ("Statement of the High Commissioner on National Minorities, Mr. Max van der Stoel" 1993, 1).

In response to these recommendations, the law "On Estonian Language Requirements for Applicants for Citizenship" set clearer language requirements and authorized the government to set policy on provisions for the elderly. A government order two months later did just that, waiving fees for elderly and invalid applicants as well as easing the test requirements. Third, the March 1993 amendment (mentioned above) was added "to bring Estonia's citizenship law in line with the Constitution and European standards and to facilitate Estonia's admission to the Council of Europe" ("Estonia Amends Citizenship Law" 1993). The change "was made under pressure from the Council of Europe, which Estonia hopes to join..." ("Constitution Watch: Estonia" 1993, 7).[12]

This influence of European organizations exists in part because they are now involved in monitoring and consulting with the Estonian government. They have an interest in what is happening. The CSCE, for example, established missions (showing a greater commitment than three or four day fact finding trips) in Tallinn and Narva to monitor events. Van der Stoel also visited the region in July 1993. A CSCE representative in Estonia told me that the organization has taken this action because it sees this as a chance to prevent what happened in Yugoslavia from developing in the Baltic region.

In addition, this activity has had an effect precisely because the Estonian government desperately wants to "rejoin Europe." They have not only responded to European criticism but also sought European advice. Samorodny told me that Europe is the main factor driving inclusiveness because "Europeaness" is so important to Estonia. The Estonian president, Lennart Meri, showed these feelings in a speech directed to European leaders on February 24 (Independence Day), 1992. He said:

> Estonia has been and will remain an open society, a part of Europe. It is precisely in the name of European values that Estonia needs a secure border... Our border is the border of European values. This border will always remain open to the likes of Andrei Sakharov; it must be sealed to Hitler and Stalin replicas. Estonia has a strong determination and will, but (w)hat Estonia does not need is rhetoric. Estonia needs the means to effectively control its border -- which is also your border; it is our common border ("Human Rights: Russia's New Justification for Interference" 1993, 9).

In an interview with leaders of the ruling Fatherland Party, I heard similar ideas about the border of Europe. They stated that the border between Europe and Russia was the river at Narva. Valery Kalabugin, member of the Congress of Estonia and the Estonian National Independence Party, took this idea even further. At a conference in 1992 in Riga, Latvia, Kalabugin stated, "This danger is strong. There are forty percent in Estonia and fifty percent in Latvia of strongly totalitarian-minded people, bearers of the Chinghiz-Khanian social culture. I mean the Russian colonists" (Kalabugin 1992). This shows the perception by some in Estonia of Russians who came to Estonia as not only different but as bearers of Asiatic values, incompatible with Estonians who are seen as "real" Europeans.

There is more to listening to European organizations, however, than a sense of Europeaness. This is shown by *which* European organizations have had the greatest effect on policy in Estonia. Groups that cannot offer monetary aid or security, such as Helsinki Watch, have not fared well. Helsinki watch has been critical of the Estonian policy, supporting instead a "zero option" policy where all

permanent residents would be granted automatic citizenship. The group claimed the 1992 law was discriminatory because "it allows in principle a certain group of people to become citizens, but qualifies their citizenship entitlements by putting them on 'second-class' footing with 'real' Estonian citizens with respect to the most important political and economic events in the near future" ("New Citizenship Laws in the Republics of the Former USSR" 1992, 3). An Estonian Foreign Ministry spokesperson stated that such Helsinki Watch reports "perturbed" her adding, "there comes a point when the political situation no longer allows Estonians to take any more action" ("Helsinki Watch Calls for Zero Option" 1993, 4).

The EC, the Council of Europe, and CSCE, in contrast, have much to offer Estonia. Economic benefits are clear. Perhaps even more important is the *perception* of security from Russian aggression. As Raid (1993, 48) states, "The Baltic states have no security guarantees beyond international law and justice, which are not very effective in an emergency situation. What the Baltic states need, however, is to become part of the new, increasingly cooperative Europe as soon as possible and to participate in the global and European processes of decision making as much as possible." Estonian leaders see cooperation with CSCE and the EC as a way to participate in and "rejoin" Europe.[13]

If the EC and CSCE have had such an important effect, why did the Estonian government produce a rather exclusive policy? The answer lies partly in Europe's failure to take an interest in issues concerning citizenship until after the initial provisions were passed. Like the Russian government, the European organizations waited until it was too late to affect the initial citizenship policy. As the EC and CSCE became more active in Estonia, however, the citizenship policies became more inclusive. Without the interest of Europe at the beginning, the role of "the nation," mentioned above, dominated the decision especially in terms of automatic citizenship provisions.

Second, the major European organizations have not pushed for the Helsinki Watch supported "zero option." Both leaders of the CSCE missions with whom I spoke indicated that some consideration must be given to the "special circumstances" surrounding the Soviet period. A CSCE report labeled the 1992 law a "compromise" (which it was), indicating at least some support from the Commission ("Russians in Estonia: Problems and Prospects" 1992, 3). Van der Stoel has also indicated that, of course, naturalization requirements in some form are to be expected, but citizenship must not be impossible to receive (for a nice example of his middle-of-the-road position, see the interview in *Echo Litvi* April 29, 1994, p. 8).[14] Thus, as Park (1994, 83) points out, while Russia, Western media, and human rights groups were critical of Estonia, "the Western governments and the major interstate organizations (like the CSCE, Baltic Sea Council, Council of Europe, etc.) were either supportive or neutral as far as Estonia's citizenship and minorities policy was concerned." In other words, the very organizations and governments that could have most directly affected the policy were least hostile to it.

The emigre community.

Estonians abroad have not played a major role in the citizenship policy since its passage. As members of the Congress of Estonia, however, some emigres did participate in the push for a law that set highly exclusive guidelines for automatic citizenship. As mentioned above, many were angry with the naturalization requirements in the 1992 law. They felt the restoration of the 1938 naturalization rules made it too easy for the "colonists" to become citizens. This calls into question the initial hypothesis that emigres would have an inclusive effect on the policy or at least indicates that one should examine the indirect effect from emigres perceiving a threat to the survival of the nation..

Indirect effects of the variables.

On the surface, it appears that Russia has had little effect. Clearly, Europe has been a stronger factor in bringing inclusive changes. Three indirect effects of Russia and the Russians in Estonia, however, must be taken into account. First, Europe became interested in Estonia only after Russian protests. It was not until Russians inside (and especially outside) Estonia complained that the CSCE set up its missions in Estonia. Thus, Russians both inside and outside Estonia may have had a less visible but important effect, with the European representatives responding to their claims and the Estonians responding to the Europeans.

Second, European groups have mediated talks in Estonia. A CSCE representative told me that part of the mission's role is to mediate discussions between the Estonians and the Russians of the northeast. The Russian government also has worked with the central CSCE organization. These examples of indirect effects do not take away from the importance of the European effect. European organizations clearly can affect policy in post-Communist states. The examples do indicate, however, that some effect from Russia and the Russians was working indirectly through the effect of Europe.

Finally, the size and power of the Russian minority has fueled claims that the Estonian nation is threatened. An Estonian Foreign Ministry statement went so far as to discuss the possible "extinction" of the Estonian nation. This perception was strong among emigres, leading many of them to support an exclusive citizenship policy. Thus, the indirect effect of the minority in creating *exclusive* provisions must be considered.

TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS

Understanding differences in citizenship policies.

This study aimed at a better understanding of the factors affecting the inclusiveness of the citizenship policies in newly independent states. Estonia and Lithuania are only two cases. All conclusions, therefore, must be tentative. But, the results are interesting and should be examined in other cases.

In the development of the Estonian citizenship policy, two of the variables, questions about the nation and the role of international organizations, had important, direct effects. Early in the development of the policy, when external actors were not showing great interest, the perceptions of a threatened ethnic nation and of Estonia as a nation-state dominated the process, leading to an exclusive policy. Here, Lithuania is a telling comparative case. The rather inclusive Lithuanian policy emerged not, as we would expect from Brubaker's argument about France and Germany, because the nation was defined politically. It was not. Rather, there was a greater acceptance of the multinational character of the state and *much* less perception of cultural threat.

After passage of the rather exclusive law in Estoina, action by European organizations directly affected the citizenship policy. Inclusive amendments were added to the citizenship law specifically because of European pressure.

The seemingly small direct effect of Russians in the country and the "powerful neighbor" was one of the larger surprises of this project. One explanation is that in a setting where independence was about ending connections to the (Russian dominated) USSR, one should not expect a large, direct effect. Second, the large minority in Estonia may have indirectly aided exclusion by fueling feelings of cultural threat. Thus, the more the Russians in Estonia threatened action in response to exclusion, the more threatening to national survival they became. Finally, one must keep in mind that the Russians probably also had an indirect effect on *inclusive* tendencies as well, first by helping to get the problem noticed in Europe and second by working with interested European organizations.

The Estonian and Lithuanian cases indicate that if citizenship policy in a newly independent state is to change over time, it is likely to change in an inclusive direction. Initially, questions of national identity can be quite powerful. Only after an initial, exclusive law are the external forces supporting inclusive provisions likely to take great interest. This is most true of the international organizations that are unlikely to get involved until controversy has appeared and the involvement can be justified. Both cases also hint at the importance of the initial citizenship law. While amendments have been added and inclusiveness increased, there have been no serious attempts to overhaul the citizenship policies in either state.

Finally, the Estonian example in particular shows the problem of not looking in great detail at each case under consideration. Had this been simply one example thrown into a statistical equation, it would be unclear which of the three factors pushing inclusiveness was most important. Evidence from interviews and other primary sources indicates, however, that Europe, not Russia or the Russians in Estonia, had the greatest *direct* effect on the inclusive changes in Estonia's citizenship policy.

Beyond citizenship policy.

The examination of the factors influencing citizenship also may generate more general propositions about policy-making in post-Communist states. This study of citizenship, for example, highlights that in the early years of independence policy decisions can be greatly affected by the debates about defining the nation and the state. These debates, however, do not take place independent of the experiences of the Communst period. The legacies of national definition and territorial connections to ethnicity from the Soviet period appear likely to play a prominent role in post-independence politics.

This study also indicates that more attention should be paid to the role of external influences on domestic policy in post-Communist states. Actors from outside both Lithuania and Estonia affected the citizenship outcome. The examination of citizenship in these states shows that Europe, in particular, can have a significant effect on the management of issues that are related to ethnic relations. For as much as leaders in Europe and the United States claim that Europe could do little to prevent the Yugoslav conflict, evidence from the Baltic region shows that early European intervention can make a difference. This is especially true for states such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania which have nowhere else to turn. The effects of ethnic nationalism are not inevitable. Nationalism thrives in times of political and economic chaos, but its effects can be limited by targeted (and conditional) Western aid and advice. To be effective, however, this action must come *before* ethnic consciousness becomes ethnic conflict, with policies such as citizenship adding fuel to the fire.

Further questions for study.

This project leaves several questions unanswered in the quest to understand the inclusiveness of citizenship policies in newly independent states, suggesting further research should be done in this area. They include:

1) Do these same factors affect citizenship in other regions?
2) Do these factors influence other policies related to citizenship (e.g. denial of rights to non-citizens)?
3) Does the effect of a perception of threat to the survival of the nation extend beyond cultural survival (would perceived threats to the survival of the independent *state* have a similar impact on citizenship)?

NOTES

1. The potential effect of the political rights limitations on representation at the national level is indicated by the differences in party support in Lithuania in late 1992. While the Lithuanians in Lithuania were evenly split in their support for Sajudis and the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) at 30 percent each, only 7 percent of Russians in Lithuania supported Sajudis while 77 percent supported the DLP. Only 9 percent of Poles in Lithuania supported Sajudis while 34 percent supported the DLP and 40 percent backed the Polish Union ("Statistics on Party Popularity Among National Groups" 1992, 75). This indicates, not surprisingly, that nationalities do not feel equally represented by different parties. Therefore, denying a large number of Russians the right to vote and form parties limits the possibility that parties supporting their positions would win seats (or even form in the first place) and likely alters drastically the policy outcomes of the new parliament.

This has an implication for the functioning of "democracy." In democratic theory, the intensity of minorities is often discussed as a way that minorities can be safe in systems based on majority rule. It is argued that a minority will have more at stake on a given issue that affects it while the majority is less committed. In this situation, the intense minority can break apart the less intense majority. This argument rests on two large assumptions. First, it is assumed that the majority is passive. In a climate of ethnonationalism where the survival of the nation is perceived to be at stake, however, the majority will not be passive. Second, it is assumed that the members of the minority have access to the political system. With political rights attached to citizenship, membership in the citizenry is essential for making claims on the political system. As Carens (1989, 36) states, "it is through politics that people articulate and defend their interests." Without citizenship, making claims and having them heard is very difficult.

2. A "state" is the "basic unit by which people are organized politically" (Shively 1993, 360). It corresponds to a given territory and is officially independent of other states. A government exists to act on behalf of the state. Canada, Switzerland, and Egypt are states. Regions in the United States that in common language we call states (such as Michigan or Ohio), however, are not states in this sense. As a political unit, one of these regions does not have "ultimate responsibility for the conduct of its own affairs" (Shively 1993, 31).

The term nation is used in many different ways. In common language in the United States, it is synonymous with "country." Social science has generally not used nation in that way, but there is still little agreement on a definition. As Riggs (1987, 109) points out:

> According to data collected in the INTERCOCTA glossary for 'ethnicity research', specialists on nationalism and ethnicity use the word 'nation' for at least four different ideas: 1. A collectivity of individuals sharing an ethnic 'marker' and an 'ethnonym' (i.e. an 'ethnic community'); 2. An ethnic community whose members live within a single state (i.e. a 'bounded community'); 3. A bounded community that has been officially recognized by the state in which it is located (i.e. an 'ethnonation'); and 4. An ethnonation that dominates a political jurisdiction (i.e. an 'autonomous nationality').

Even this summary misses the point that, traditionally, the question of membership in the nation has been answered in both *ethnic* (some use the term "cultural") and *political* terms (see Walicki 1982, ch. 4). The ethnic answer bases the definition of the nation on characteristics, such as culture, language, religion, historical "memories" and creation myths, that Smith (1989) has called the nation's "ethnic core." This ethnic variant of nationhood tends to stress the positive traits of the nation and the negative traits of others (see Harsanyi 1991, 1-2, on the Romanian case.) These ethnic qualities are used to create a boundary between "us" and "them." It is not surprising that efforts at defining nations in the former Soviet Union would bring an ethnic answer. An ethnic definition of the nation was official Soviet policy. This policy dictated nationality based on birth into a *cultural* group (though one had a choice

between groups if parents were of different nationalities). Stalin defined the nation as a "historically evolved, stable community arising on the foundation of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup, manifested in a community of culture" (in Pipes 1964, 37-38).

For this project, a "nation" is considered to be a self-aware collective united by shared cultural features (myths, symbols, values, etc.) and the belief that its members have a *right* to political control of a "homeland." As the pursuit of territorial control is a necessary feature of nationalism, this *belief* in the right to territorial control of a homeland is a necessary feature of a nation. It is part of what makes a nation different from other groups in society (e.g. an ethnic group or a class). This definition, while mentioning common cultural traits and symbols, does not exclude a political idea of the nation. "Americans," the ultimate political nation, are united by shared myths, symbols, and cultural attributes.

3. By now, the reader has probably thought, "perceived by *whom*?" Since citizenship policy is a policy, it is necessary to look at the perceptions of the elites making the decisions. One cannot completely exclude the masses (since presumably the elites are taking mass attitudes into account, and referendums may be used to solve controversial issues). Yet, in general, members of parliament and the executive are making the final decisions.

A solid case can be made that, for the idea of "nation," elites in the newly independent states are generally starting with an ethnic definition. Whether this will change over time is another question, but in the short run the Soviet legacy will continue to have a great impact. The Russian word for nation, *natsiya*, is understood by Russians (and to my knowledge other nationalities as well) to mean a (large) ethnically defined nation. Just as we would expect the American politicians to continue using "nation" in a political-territorial way (to mean country), we should expect the former Soviet elites to use the term in the way they learned it. The perception of the state as a nation-state is harder to pin down. Statements by leaders in the Baltic states indicate that these states are seen by the elites as nation-states. Certainly Stepan (1992) argues this in his examination of Estonia. What can be said for certain is that no single view will be held by *every* political elite on issues such as these. Therefore, it is important to look at the perceptions of the elites who controlled the shaping of and voting for the policy. Like any policy decision, citizenship involves winners and losers. I will focus most of all on the perceptions of those who controlled the policy-making process (the winners).

4. Even in international law, the term "minority" lacks a precise definition (for a detailed discussion of the idea of "minority," see Thornberry 1987). The most useful definition I have found comes from Canadian Jules Deschenes (in Thornberry 1987). Deschenes describes a minority as, "a group of citizens of the State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law." The problem, of course, with this definition is the assumption of citizenship for the minority. Clearly, as the Estonian case shows, members of a minority ethnic group may not always be citizens. Therefore, I accept the definition of Deschenes but replace "citizens" with "permanent residents."

It is also important to point out that while I generally refer to the minorities in Lithuania and as "Russians," there are large numbers of Poles in Lithuania and other smaller groups in both states. Many use the term "Russian-speaking" for Estonia. While this captures the small number of non-Russians in the non-indigenous group, it is rather clumsy. In addition, it does not fit the Poles in Lithuania who speak Polish, Lithuanian or a dialect somewhere in between.

5. An example of the use of economic power by an excluded minority to gain citizenship took place in Sri Lanka. De Silva (1986, 30) describes how "plantation Tamils" (brought to Ceylon by the British in the 1800s and different than native Sri Lankan Tamils) received citizenship after applying

economic pressure on the Sri Lankan government. The plantation workers organized a three month campaign in which they prayed for half the day but demanded a full day's wage. When the government threatened to pay them for half a day, the largest plantation workers' union (CWC) "warned that the workers might then have to pray in the afternoons too." This action "provided the leverage that helped forge" the agreement between Sri Lanka and India on citizenship for this group (De Silva 1986, 30).

6. While this sounds obvious, it is crucial to understanding why an external factor may or may not play an important role. As Spanier (1984, 76, 78) puts it, "in international politics force or coercion takes the place of government...(t)he threat of force is an obvious example of coercion matched by the 'reward' of withholding it and not hurting the adversary; the threat of withholding resources vital to a nation's industry or of greatly raising the prices of these resources is also an effective form of coercion." Can the external actor offer needed military or monetary aid? Can it punish through economic sanctions or military involvement? Can it offer prestige or protection through alliance? These questions are especially important to the governments of small, resource-poor states which may need help from the outside to develop, would suffer more than larger states if they faced economic sanctions, and have a history of being conquered by larger military powers.

7. There are numerous examples of the effects of international bodies on policy decisions in a given state. The IMF has played a crucial role in affecting (some would say setting) economic policy in developing countries. Works on democratization indicate an important effect of the EC on countries such as Greece. Rules laid down by the EC combined with the desire in Greece to join the EC brought changes. The EC "actively promoted democratization, and prospective Community membership was an incentive to countries to democratize" (Huntington 1991, 91). In Spain and Portugal, the EC's demand that the countries become more open if they wanted membership in the community also affected regime change. The economic benefits of membership combined with a "pervasive desire to identify their countries with Europe" to bring domestic political change to the countries (Huntington 1991, 88). Likewise, the "Helsinki Process" put pressure on Communist governments to liberalize and provided legitimacy to the efforts of internal dissidents (Huntington 1991, 91).

One would think that if the European incentives were strong enough to bring regime change, surely European groups could affect a specific policy such as citizenship. Unlike the general notion of "democracy," however, the European example on citizenship is less clear. Germany's citizenship policy in particular remains a perfect counterexample to those who claim exclusion and European identity are contradictory. Thus, while the desire to "(re)join Europe" may be great in many of the newly independent states, the potential for Europe to influence *by example* is weakened by existing exclusive citizenship policies in Europe.

8. It is important to note that the "nation" variable is the only one that is predicted *directly* to make a policy more exclusive. The existence of the other variables brings direct pressure for inclusion (but note the indirect effect of a large minority increasing the possibility of a perception of threat to the nation and the threat to the nation making support of inclusion by the emigre community less likely). This implies that certain values of the "perception of the nation" variable (nation as ethnically defined and state as a nation-state) are *necessary and sufficient* for an exclusive policy. This is the only variable that I claim has this type of explanatory power. The part of this variable concerning threat to the survival of the nation may also play a role but only in cases where the first two parts of this variable would bring exclusion (remember from Figure 1 that perception of threat is not likely to be a factor in cases of politically defined nations or multinational states).

This claim has an implication for falsifiablility. To qualify as an explanatory theory in the social sciences, the theory must be falsifiable. One's claims must be made in such a way that they could be tested and rejected. While I feel that all the hypothesized relationships in the theory are falsifiable, this is

very clear in the case of the "nation" variable. If the government of a newly independent state develops a quite exclusive policy without the above stated perceptions in place, it would falsify the theory and model I have presented.

9. Yet, as mentioned earlier, the law was exclusive enough that no Russians were elected to the new parliament. In addition, the psychological effect on the non-citizens was devastating (see Stepan 1992). The tone set by the law (as well as a June 1992 national referendum in which broadening the electorate was rejected) and resulting perceptions of exclusion by non-citizens were probably more important than the provisions themselves (see "'Draconian' Law Encroaches Minorities" 1992, 71). Surveys in Narva by the Viru Infocenter showed a major difference in the attitude of the Russian minority between 1990 and 1992. In 1990, only 24 percent of respondents felt the rights of non-Estonians were being violated. In 1992, the figure was 65 percent.

The policy meant that around three quarters of the non-Estonians were unable to receive automatic citizenship ("Statement by Tunne Kelam" 1993, 1). Even Russians able to apply for citizenship, however, felt like second class members of the population given the political climate. This explains in part the low numbers of those eligible for automatic citizenship that have applied for it since the policy was adopted. Of the nearly 150,000 non-Estonians eligible for automatic citizenship, only 12,000 became citizens by June 1993 ("Statement by Tunne Kelam" 1993, 1).

10. Non-citizens have made appeals to the idea of "democracy," U.N. declarations on minorities, and even Estonian law to make their case. A member of the former parliament, Vladimir Lebedev, filed a lawsuit with the Estonian Supreme Court over his failure to receive automatic citizenship. He pointed to Article 3 of the Russian-Estonian treaty signed in January 1991, which states residents of both countries have the right to "either retain or receive" citizenship in the state of their choice, and Article 3 of the citizenship law, which states citizenship should be granted to those eligible under international agreements ("Deputy Sues Government Over Citizenship Law" 1992, 70; "RDME: 'On Citizenship'" 1992, 27).

11. In other words, the Russian community had begun to accept the inevitability of independence and even look forward to the relative prosperity of life in Estonia. Evidence presented in Silver and Titma (forthcoming) indicates that Russians in Estonia even before the coup in 1991 supported the idea of gradual independence or Estonia as a member of a commonwealth much more than they supported confederation or a new union treaty within the Soviet Union (see Table 4-1). Those with less knowledge of Estonian and those who lived in "mostly Russian" cities in Estonia, however, were less likely than other Russians in Estonia to support independence (see Tables 4-3 and 4-4).

12. The European effect is also indicated by the statements of Estonian officials comparing the naturalization requirements to other European countries (see "Report of the CSCE ODIHR Mission 1992, 6). Of course, it should be pointed out that the Estonians had little choice on the issue of naturalization. In order to justify their claim that the citizenship policy was a continuation of the 1938 policy, the requirement of two years residency plus a year wait after application had to be used. This was the residency requirement in the 1938 law.

A final indication of the effect of Europe is that changes in policy that appear to be aimed toward the Russians in Estonia are in reality intended more as signs to Europe of Estonia's good will. Peet Kask told me that, in general, they are "more exhibition...than serious will." This includes the creation of the Estonian Institute for Human Rights. Perhaps the best example of this, however, is the "Round Table of non-citizens and ethnic minorities" announced by President Meri on June 25, 1993. The Round Table is charged with presenting the president "conclusions of their discussions" which he will examine and, depending on the issue, forward to the Council of Europe and the CSCE ("Office of

the President, Republic of Estonia, Communique" 1993). Thus, it appears that the development of the Round Table was aimed, to a large degree, at Europe. If so, it worked. On July 1, 1993, Meri received a letter from Max van der Stoel, high commissioner on national minorities of the CSCE, complementing him on the establishment of the Round Table.

13. Whether European organizations and countries would actually act against Russian aggression is another question. Lieven (1993, 374) states that "A keynote of Baltic national feeling since its rebirth in the 1980s has been a desire to 'return to Europe'. Balts feel also -- and rightly -- that the rest of Europe has a duty to help them do so." Yet, "The West today is quite clear, not surprisingly, that it is not prepared to fight to defend the Baltic States, any more than it was between 1920 and 1940." While Max van der Stoel has perhaps raised hopes with comments such as, "it is clear that one state may not interfere in the internal affairs of another state and must respect its sovereignty" (*Echo Litvi* April 29, 1994, p. 8), the Baltic leaders are playing a dangerous game if they continue to alienate Russia. Fortunately for stability in the region, the goals of the Europeans and the Russians are fairly similar. While European elites do discuss the Soviet "occupation" (something the Russians are less willing to consider), Europe has supported the views of both Russia and the Russians in Estonia by pushing for increased inclusiveness.

14. In this interview (printed in *Echo Litvi* and the Latvian paper *Diena*) van der Stoel produces arguments favoring both sides of the citizenship debate. As mentioned above, he states the Russia must not interfere "in the internal affairs of another state" and must "respect its sovereignty." He follows this by stating, "On the other side, it is important for governments to encourage this process. It is necessary also to help in other spheres, for example, in language instruction." In addition, he mentions that leaders of numerous states show concern for fellow ethnics across their borders. The following statement (the last in the article) summarizes his soft position:

> I think you agreed with me that you cannot send these people away. This means the question is what status to grant them. If you in principle reject citizenship for them, it is inviting marked displeasure which increases tensions in Latvia and Estonia. If you propose for them citizenship on condition that they agree to integrate into Latvian or Estonian society, you provide for them the perspective that it is possible to help secure their loyalty to Latvia or Estonia. Therefore, I am for this solution, although I understand your bitterness concerning events in the Soviet period.

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